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Theory of nancial intermediation gives contradicting answers to the question whether
banks should diversify or focus their loan portfolios. Our aim is to nd out which of the
two strategies is predominant in the German banking market. To this end we measure
diversication for all German banks in the period from 1993 to 2002. As measures we use a
broad set of heuristic approaches which capture the deviation of a bank's portfolio from a
specied benchmark. Conceivable benchmarks are naive diversication across all industries
or, alternatively, the economy's industry structure. With this framework our analysis
comprises the widespread measures of concentration, like the Hirschman-Herndahl index,
but also the less known and in this context innovative group of distance measures. We nd
that dierent statistical measures of diversication may indicate contradicting results on
the individual bank level. Since distance measures are more appealing from a theoretical
point of view, the common practice to rely on measures of concentration only in the debate
about diversication and focus, may be misleading. We further nd that, despite these
dierences on the individual bank level, both approaches reveal that the majority of banks
signicantly increased loan portfolio diversication over the last decade. This tendency is
especially driven by the large number of credit cooperatives and savings banks. However,
some banks (especially regional banks and subsidiaries of foreign banks) reveal a strategy
that seems to be more focused on certain industries.
Keywords:
bank lending, loan portfolio, portfolio theory, diversication, concentration measures, dis-
tance measures, focus
JEL classication:
G11, G21, C43Non-technical Summary
Should banks diversify their loan portfolios, or should they focus on homogenous lenders?
From a theoretical point of view there is no clear answer to this question. Diversication
may reduce risk in the sense of the classical portfolio theory (Markowitz (1952)). Focus,
on the other hand, may improve the bank's knowledge of a specic segment and therefore
enhance the protability of the loan portfolio. In our study we analyse how German banks
have actually operated in the period between 1993 and 2002. To this end we calculate
dierent statistical measures of the banks' industrial diversication. The data are taken
from the Deutsche Bundesbank's borrowers statistics, which contain a panel of all German
banks' loans to various industries.
The most customary benchmarks of diversication measure concentration, examples be-
ing the Hirschman-Herndahl index and the Gini coecient. The common feature of
these measures is that they capture the extent to which a portfolio diers from naive
diversication. If markets are concentrated, however, naive diversication may not be
an appropriate benchmark. We therefore additionally draw on distance measures (Png-
sten and Rudolph (2002)). Distance measures capture the dierence to any user-dened
benchmark portfolio.
The results are:
1. In the period between 1993 and 2002 German banks showed a trend towards increas-
ing diversication.
2. The general trend towards increasing diversication is mainly driven by the large
number of savings banks and cooperative banks. Regional banks and subsidiaries
of foreign banks, by contrast, have tended to focus their loan portfolios. Big banks,
in the aggregate, seem to have neither focused nor diversied. However, at the
beginning of the sample their loan portfolios were more diversied than those of the
other banking groups.
3. Measures of concentration and measures of distance often produce contradictory
results when applied to individual banks. Since distance measures are theoretically
more convincing, they should be used more often as measures of diversication.Nichttechnische Zusammenfassung
Sollten Banken ihre Kreditportfolien diversizieren, oder sollten sie sich auf bestimmte
Marktsegmente spezialisieren? Vom theoretischen Standpunkt her l asst sich die Frage
nicht eindeutig beantworten. Diversikation kann zu einer Risikoreduktion im Sinne der
klassischen Portfoliotheorie (Markowitz (1952)) f uhren. Spezialisierung hingegen kann die
Marktkenntnisse einer Bank und damit die Protabilit at der Kreditb ucher verbessern. In
der vorliegenden Studie wird untersucht, wie sich deutsche Banken im Zeitraum von 1993
bis 2002 tats achlich verhalten haben. Zu diesem Zweck werden die Branchenportfolien der
Banken mit verschiedenen Diversikationsmaen untersucht. Datenbasis ist die Kredit-
nehmerstatistik der Deutschen Bundesbank, die die Kreditvergabe der einzelnen deutschen
Banken an verschiedene Branchen im Zeitablauf enth alt.
Die gebr auchlichsten Diversikationsmae sind Konzentrationsmae, wie z. B. der Hirsch-
man-Herndahl-Index oder der Gini Koezient. Konzentrationsmae verbindet die Eigen-
schaft, dass sie den Unterschied zur naiven Diversikation messen. In konzentrierten
M arkten ist naive Diversikation aber m oglicherweise keine geeignete Benchmark. Da-
her setzen wir dar uber hinaus auch Distanzmae (Pngsten und Rudolph (2002)) ein.
Distanzmae messen die Abweichung zu beliebig festlegbaren Benchmarkportfolios.
Die Ergebnisse der Untersuchung sind:
1. Deutsche Banken haben im Zeitraum zwischen 1993 bis 2002 tendenziell ihre na-
tionalen Kreditportfolien fortw ahrend st arker diversiziert.
2. Der allgemeine Trend zur Diversikation ist in erster Linie auf den Sparkassen- und
Kreditgenossenschaftssektor zur uckzuf uhren. Regionalbanken und Zweigstellen aus-
l andischer Kreditinstitute haben sich eher spezialisiert. Grobanken zeigen weder
einen Trend zur Diversikation noch zur Spezialisierung, weisen aber schon zum
Untersuchungsbeginn einen h oheren Grad an Diversikation auf als alle anderen
Bankengruppen.
3. Auf individueller Ebene kommen Konzentrations- und Distanzmae oft zu entge-
gengesetzten Ergebnissen. Aufgrund der theoretischen Vorz uge sollten daher Dis-
tanzmae verst arkt zur Messung von Diversikation herangezogen werden.Contents
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1 Introduction
Theoretical and empirical studies in corporate nance yield diering observations regard-
ing diversication. While it is performance-improving in the classical theory following
Markowitz (1952), it reduces rm value at least for large conglomerates (cf Lang and
Stulz (1994) or Berger and Ofek (1995)). A loan portfolio is an investment in risky assets,
to which none of these observations necessarily directly applies, since banks are interme-
diaries. In nancial intermediation theory we nd recommendations that banks should
diversify to reduce risk as well as suggestions to focus in their loan origination on indus-
tries about which they have superior knowledge, as their superior monitoring abilities will
then increase risk-adjusted returns.
Those who believe that banks are quite naturally diversied should note that the area
a bank covers may have an unbalanced industry structure, or the bank may willingly
focus on, or at least build up special knowledge in, particular industries. Some examples
that have a avour of both aspects may suce for the moment to make this point: HSH
Nordbank, a regional state bank active especially along Germany's North Sea and Baltic
Sea coasts, is the world's largest ship nancier.1 Stadtsparkasse K oln, a regional savings
bank in one of Germany's media centres, claims to have superior knowledge of the media
business and to be among the leading loan originators for the German media industry.2
Deutsche Apotheker- und  Arztebank, Germany's largest primary cooperative bank, only
originates loans to the medical professions.3
The question of diversication versus focus is a question within the very nature of banks
as delegated monitors in the sense of Diamond (1984). Diamond (1984) argues that diver-
sication reduces the threat of nancial distress as returns of projects are assumed to be
imperfectly correlated. This reasoning is in line with classical portfolio theory (Markowitz
(1952)). However, monitoring costs are considered to be constant in the Diamond model.
Moreover, the quality of monitoring cannot be inuenced by a bank. A group of theoreti-
cal models challenges these points. Stomper (2004) analyses a bank's incentive to build up
sector expertise. In the equilibrium of his model we observe a coexistence of specialized
and diversied banks. The more banks invest in hiring sector or industry experts, the less
benet can be derived from building up sector or industry expertise. Winton (1999) points
out that banks' chances of failure are endogenously aected by the choice of loan port-
folio structures. In his theoretical framework, the risks and costs of poor diversication
We are indebted to the discussants and participants at conferences including a Research Seminar at
Deutsche Bundesbank (Frankfurt, Germany, March 2004), a Banking Workshop at the University of
M unster (M unster, Germany, May 2004), the 66th Annual Conference of the Association of University
Professors of Management (Graz, Austria, June 2004), the 19th Annual Meeting of the European
Economic Association (Madrid, Spain, August 2004) and the 11th Annual Meeting of the German
Finance Association (T ubingen, Germany, October 2004) for helpful comments on an earlier version
of the paper. All remaining errors are, of course, ours. The rst author is indebted to the Verein f ur
Socialpolitik and Deutsche Bundesbank for a travel grant in order to attend the European Economic
Association conference.
Some additional material concerning our statistical analysis is available upon request.
1 See HSH Nordbank (2003).
2 See Stadtsparkasse K oln (2003).
3 See Deutsche Apotheker- und  Arztebank (2004).
-1-versus bene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structure. Diversication across industries appears to be the superior strategy when the
downside risks of loans are moderate. If loans are characterised by high downside risks,
banks should focus on their monitoring abilities and limit loan origination to industries
about which they have superior knowledge. The work of Winton shows that credit risk is
endogenously aected by a bank's monitoring decisions. The credit risk of an individual
loan or a homogenous group of borrowers is not, as assumed by loan portfolio models as
CreditMetrics, CreditRisk+ or CreditPortfolioView, exogenous. Banks can inuence the
credit risk of a loan investment by building up expertise and strengthening monitoring
quality. Winton (1999) also hints at the "winner's curse" problem when banks expand
their loan origination into new industries, especially when they face strong competition in
that new industry. That may make diversication into new sectors very costly. The theo-
retical work of Gehrig (1998), Dell'Ariccia et al. (1999), Dell'Ariccia (2001) and Marquez
(2002) explicitly shows that there is a winner's curse problem when banks expand their
loan origination into new sectors or geographic regions. Shaer (1998) provides empiri-
cal evidence for the winner's curse eect. Newly founded banks experience substantially
higher loan chargeo rates during their third through ninth years than their longer-existing
competitors.
Considering these contradicting suggestions on how to optimize a loan portfolio, it is
surprising that there is hardly any empirical work (for the few exceptions see the next
section) on the composition of banks' loan portfolios.4 Which lending strategy is actually
used by banks ? Do banks diversify their loan portfolios or do they focus on certain
industries? We will shed light on this question by analysing the loan portfolio compositions
of all German banks. To this end we suggest a set of several measures of statistical
diversication in order to quantify banks' loan portfolio diversication. A second aim of
our paper is to analyse possible dierences between measures of diversication.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of the scarce em-
pirical literature related to our own work. In Section 3 our data and methodology will
be described in some detail. In particular dierent concepts of diversication and their
related measures will be discussed. Section 4 collects our empirical results for various mea-
sures of diversication and analyses the relationship between them. Finally, conclusions
are drawn and extensions suggested in Section 5.
2 Related empirical literature
An overview of the existing empirical work on loan portfolios will illustrate that it is
entirely unclear how loan portfolio diversication should be measured. There are three
empirical papers that are closely linked to our research question, but each having a dierent
focus.
Acharya et al. (2004) analyse the eects of loan portfolio diversication on risk and return
gures. They examine 105 Italian banks over the period from 1993 to 1999. As a measure
of diversication, they use the Hirschman-Herndahl Index (HHI), which they compute
for industrial and sectoral diversication. The industrial HHI (I-HHI) is the sum of the
squares of relative exposures under the given classication of industries. The sectoral HHI
is calculated analogously. The boundaries of the HHI are given by
4 One possible explanation for this gap in the literature may be the lack of suitable data.
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n
 HHI  1 ; (1)
where n stands for the number of segments. Note that the index reaches its minimum
when the exposures to all segments (industries, sectors) are equal. It is 1 when all loans
are originated in one segment.
The eect of diversication on dierent return and risk gures is analysed using panel
regressions. The results show that industrial diversication is linked to a decrease in
performance, expressed as declining returns and even an increase in risk. The sectoral
diversication has an unclear eect on banks with moderate risk but decreases the perfor-
mance of banks characterised by a high level of risk. Acharya et al. (2004) conclude that
"diversication, per se, is no guarantee of superior performance or greater bank safety" (p
36).
A study on the eects of diversication for nancial services rms in the Unites States is
performed by Elyasiani and Deng (2004). However, bank supervisors in the United States
do not collect data on the loan portfolio composition by industry. Therefore, the analysis
comprises sectoral, geographical and activity diversication. Sectoral diversication means
the diversication of loans over six sectors: Commercial and industrial, depository insti-
tutions, real estate, agriculture, individual, and other loans. Geographical diversication
captures the composition of loan portfolios by loans originated by domestic and foreign
oces of a bank. Activity diversication stands for the composition of non-interest in-
come by activity lines as eg trading income or service charges.5 Similar to Acharya et al.
(2004) all dimensions of diversication are quantied by using the HHI. Elyasiani and
Deng (2004) nd that all dimensions of diversication lead to decreasing returns as well as
decreasing income. They therefore conclude that the question of diversication is a very
typical question of a risk and return tradeo.6
One can derive from Acharya et al. (2004) and Elyasiani and Deng (2004) the tentative
recommendation that loan portfolio policy should not be driven by diversication but by
a bank's specic monitoring abilities in industries or sectors. Given this statement, it
would be interesting to know which strategy banks actually follow in managing their loan
portfolios. The work of Acharya et al. (2004) and Elyasiani and Deng (2004) lacks a time
series analysis in order to identify trends towards diversication or specialisation.
The work of Pngsten and Rudolph (2002) partially lls this gap for Germany. Their
analysis is based on aggregate data of German bank groups covering the period from
1970 to 2001. The authors measure diversication by distance measures, quantifying the
distance between a bank group's loan portfolio and the market's loan portfolio. The
diversication by industry is considered for up to 16 industries. The data comprise the
lending to businesses and only involve national loan origination.
In running a time series analysis, Pngsten and Rudolph (2002) nd that bank groups
increased their loan portfolio diversication over time. However, this result might be
driven by the aggregation of data. Aggregating data of banks that specialise in dierent
industries may still lead to an increasingly diversied loan portfolio at bank group level.
Thus, an analysis of individual banks is necessary to conrm or reject the result that
portfolio diversication is the leading strategy in the recent lending practice of German
banks.
5 See Elyasiani and Deng (2004), pp 19-20.
6 See Elyasiani and Deng (2004), pp 40-41.
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Elyasiani and Deng (2004), we work with individual bank data and use the HHI as one,
but in our case not the only measure of diversication. We add several other measures
including distance measures as suggested by Pngsten and Rudolph (2002) and perform
both a panel analysis and a time series analysis. This enables us not only to examine
which of the two strategies - diversication or focus - individual German banks follow, but
also how their behaviour seems to have changed over time.
3 Data and empirical methods
3.1 Data
We use individual bank-level data, which, in our case, are provided by the Deutsche
Bundesbank and are part of the borrowers statistics. All banks with a banking licence
for the German market have to report their exposures to corporate borrowers, private
borrowers, and non-prot organisations. Exposures to private borrowers are subdivided
into loans for housing, consumer loans, and other private loans like credit card loans.
Exposures to corporate clients are reported for 23 industries. An overview of the lending
towards the 23 industries is provided in Table 1. The data set only comprises national
loan origination. As most banks in the data set are small regional institutions without any
international business, this limitation does not appear to be crucial. However, we cannot
measure geographical diversication outside Germany.
The segmentation of private borrowing is rather heterogeneous. Loans to one individual
customer might, for instance, occur in all three segments, limiting an analysis of a bank's
loan portfolio strategy considerably. A bank's loan portfolio strategy might therefore best
be analysed by focusing on loan origination to corporate clients, as diversication across
industries does best represent our understanding of diversication. Therefore, we restrict
our analysis to the origination of loans to corporate clients in 23 industries. Our data set
consists of semi-annual data for the period from 1993 to 2002, ie 20 observations for each
bank.
Additional attention must be given to the handling of mergers. Especially within the group
of savings banks and credit cooperatives, we have observed much consolidation over the
last decade. To isolate our analysis from eects of mergers, we include only banks existing
in December 2002 and treat all banks that merged during the period of our analysis as if
they had been merged over the whole period. As a consequence, the banks in our data set
will probably be more diversied in the beginning than they actually were.7
The data set comprises all banks that have a license for the German banking market. At
the end of 2002 this number amounted to 2;231 banks. Our analysis covers 2;218 banks,
as 13 banks have no exposures to corporate customers at all. The banks are grouped in
10 dierent bank groups, which can be assigned to 4 categories. These groups are (in
brackets the number of banks within a group):
1. Commercial banks
(a) Big banks (4)
7 Analysing the eects of mergers on loan portfolio diversication will be an issue for our future research.
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(c) Subsidiaries of foreign banks (33)
2. Banks under public law
(a) Savings banks (520)
(b) State banks (13)
3. Cooperative banks
(a) Credit cooperatives (1485)
(b) Regional cooperative institutions (2)
4. Other banks
(a) Special-purpose banks (8)
(b) Private mortgage banks (16)
(c) State mortgage banks (3)
Credit cooperatives and savings banks are by numbers the biggest bank groups in the
German banking market. Savings banks (Sparkassen) are publicly owned by communities,
cities, counties or other (groups of) jurisdictions. Credit cooperatives (Kreditgenossen-
schaften) aim to provide support to their members and have their very origin in rural
communities as well as craft communities. Credit cooperatives as well as savings banks
oer similar services to commercial banks. Banks of these groups only operate in a local
market which should not overlap with markets of other banks within the same group. The
group of regional commercial banks mainly comprises private bankers. Results for the
category of other banks are, due to their minor importance, not displayed separately. In
order to avoid identication of single banks, results for the two regional cooperative banks
are not presented separately, either.
3.2 Dierent concepts of diversication
Following Markowitz (1952) a portfolio is ecient if there is no other portfolio with lower
risk and an (at least) equal expected return and no portfolio with a higher expected
return and (at most) equal risk. In this context diversication is a means to change the
risk of the portfolio. For liquid assets the portfolio's risk can be measured as the standard
deviation from expected returns. This setting can hardly be applied to loan portfolios. For
one thing, the distribution of returns from loans is highly skewed, making the standard
deviation inappropriate. For another, the distribution depends on the correlations between
returns. In contrast to liquid assets, the correlation between returns from loans cannot
easily be observed. One must also remember that the gures needed would be specic
to each bank as credit risk is endogenously aected by a bank's expertise and monitoring
abilities. We presume that, for these reasons, most banks of our sample apply heuristics
to determine the diversication of their loan portfolios.
Acharya et al. (2004) apply a measure of the HHI in order to quantify loan portfolio diver-
sication. In addition to the HHI we will introduce several other measures of concentration
and (in-)equality as statistical measures of loan portfolio diversication. Concentration
measures refer to diversication in a naive form: one may remember, for example, from
-5-Equation 1 that the HHI reaches its minimum when all exposures to di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equal, ie the HHI quanties naive diversication with a 1=n-diversication strategy as the
benchmark. Generally concentration measures come with the drawback that they ignore
the size dierence of an economy's industries. An example may illustrate the relevance of
this problem: From Table 1, we can see that "manufacturing of non-metallic mineral prod-
ucts is one of the smallest industries within the set of 23 industries, whereas "wholesale
and retail trade" belongs to the biggest industries.8 Having the same exposure to a highly
specialised and very small industry as to a major industry of an economy might already
be regarded as specialisation in the rst industry. Thus, industry weights should matter
when measuring diversication. Therefore, we suggest applying a benchmark which re-
ects the industry composition of an economy when measuring portfolio diversication.
We follow Pngsten and Rudolph (2002) and use distance measures to quantify statistical
diversication. The distance from a benchmark can be measured by describing a loan port-
folio composition as the (normalised) vector of relative industry shares. In this setting,
diversication is at its maximum when a bank's loan portfolio composition reects the
industry shares of the benchmark under review. Distance measures are better heuristics
for portfolio management since they use the market as a benchmark.
In the following, we will test whether the bias which occurs when using naive diversication
as a benchmark is empirically relevant. To this end we compute a set of concentration
measures (which incude the HHI, Gini coecient and Shannon entropy measures) and a
set of distance measures and then compare the results.
To formalise, loans are partitioned into n segments. Let X
b;t
i be the nominal exposure of




n ) is the vector of nominal
loan exposures of bank b at time t to all loan segments i = 1;::::;n. By x
b;t
















n ) is the vector of these shares in the portfolio of bank b at time
t.9 By yt = (yt
1;:::;yt
n) we denote the shares of the loan segments in a benchmark's loan
portfolio.
We distinguish between two groups of measures. The rst group of measures quanties
naive diversication. We will use the HHI, the Gini coecient and the Shannon entropy
measures in order to quantify naive diversication. The second group of measures takes
into account the fact that an economy's industries dier in size. These measures relate
to benchmarks that reect the industry composition of the economy. Given the tradeo
between diversication of loan portfolios and focus on homogenous lenders as depicted in
the introduction, measuring diversication of loan portfolios does not imply quantifying
the risk of a loan portfolio.
8 At the end of 2002 manufacturing of non-metallic mineral products accounted for 0:65% of Germany's
loan market, trade for 12:69%.
9 When later dening diversication measures, we suppress the superscripts b;t for simplicity.
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3.3.1 Measures of naive diversication
The Hirschman-Herndahl Index (HHI) is a commonly accepted measure of market con-





as a measure of diversication, where small values mean high diversication. Note that
the lower limit for the HHI is 1=23 and is attained when exposures to all loan segments
are equal. The HHI is equal to 1 when all loans are granted to one segment.
The Gini coecient (G) is often used as a measure of inequality. However, it can also be
used to quantify the concentration of a loan portfolio. If one considers the Lorenz curve
of an individual bank's loan portfolio, the Gini index is the ratio of the area between the
diagonal and the Lorenz curve of a bank and the area of the whole triangle below the
diagonal. The Gini coecient of an individual bank b at time t is calculated as:














^ xi ; (5)
where ^ xi represents the relative industry shares of a loan portfolio, sorted by size in
ascending order. Thus, vj is the cumulated share of the j smallest industries in a loan
portfolio.
Maximum diversication is reached when we observe equal exposures to all industries.
That is, the Lorenz curve is diagonal. The Gini coecient is zero. Maximum focus will
lead to a Gini coecient of 22=23.
Entropy measures are also powerful instruments to indicate variety in distributions at a
given point in time. Their potential applications include measuring industrial concen-
tration or corporate diversication.10 We apply the Shannon entropy11 (S) in order to








It is standard practice to dene xi  ln( 1
xi) = 0 if xi = 0.12 For the HHI and the Gini
coecient, large values of these measures stand for focus whereas small values stand for
diversication. In order to maintain this idea we dene ^ S =  S. If all loans are to one
industry ^ S is 0, representing maximum focus. Perfect naive diversication is expressed as
a value of  ln(23).
10 See Frenken (2004).
11 See Shannon (1948).
12 See Theil (1972).
-7-3.3.2 Benchmark measures
As was pointed out earlier, measures of naive diversication apply an equal distribution
of loans across all industries as their benchmark, incorporating the unpleasant feature of
not being independent of the denition and aggregation of industries. Therefore Pngsten
and Rudolph (2002) have suggested measuring diversication with respect to more general
benchmarks.
As suggested by Pngsten and Rudolph (2002) the industry composition of the economy's
loan market portfolio can be used as a benchmark for statistical diversication. However,
this benchmark neglects regional business structures. If the loan portfolio of a bank
reects the industry structure of its region, than a decline in distance of an individual
bank to the national market loan portfolio might be due to a change in regional industry
structures. Therefore, our analysis also comprises the distance of an individual bank's loan
portfolio to regional benchmarks. These benchmarks are the composition of a state's loan
portfolio and the composition of a county's loan portfolio. Another possible nationwide
benchmark is to use the industries' contributions to GNP as reference point for loan
portfolio diversication.13 Thus, we apply 4 benchmarks as reference points for statistical
diversication:
1. composition by industry of the whole German loan market portfolio (DNation
j ),
2. composition by industry of a state's loan market portfolio (DState
j ),
3. composition by industries of a county's loan market portfolio (D
County
j ),
4. composition of industries' contributions to GNP (DGNP
j ).
When setting distance measures, diversication is measured by quantifying the distance
between a bank's loan portfolio and the benchmark's loan portfolio. Larger values mean
less diversication.14
Following Pngsten and Rudolph (2002), we use several measures:
Measure 1 Maximum Absolute Dierence
D1(x;y) = max
i
fjxi   yijg : (7)






jxi   yij : (8)






(xi   yi)2 : (9)
13 An overview of the contribution to GNP by industries is given by Table 1. The classication of
industries does not perfectly reect the classication of industries used in the loan statistics. Thus,
when referring to the GNP as a benchmark, we only take those 21 industries in consideration where
the same classication of industries applies for both data sets.
14 For some basic properties of distance measures see Pngsten and Rudolph (2002).




















Before we start analysing the data, it is important to understand some characteristics
of these measures. Note that all are normalised to the interval [0;1]. D1 just gives
the maximum absolute dierence across all loan segments, jxi   yij, between a bank's
portfolio x and the benchmark portfolio y. Thus, it is only sensitive to the segment with
the biggest absolute dierence. D2 is a normalised version of the arithmetic mean of the
absolute dierences across all segments. It can be interpreted as the proportion of a bank's
portfolio x which would have to be rearranged in order to achieve the composition of the
benchmark portfolio. D3 assigns higher weights to large deviations from the benchmark.15
Measures D4 and D5 represent measures based on relative dierences
jxi yij
xi+yi .16 The relative
measures D4 and D5 have the property that the deviation in each segment is seen relative
to the size of this segment. However, these measures come with a disadvantage when
some of the segments are not relevant (that is xi = 0). Each segment i with xi = 0
contributes 1=n towards the distance measure, irrespective of the related yi. Measures
D4 and D5 correspond to measures D2 (average deviations) and D3 (squared deviations)
respectively.17
A further set of indices is given by calculating the ratio of an individual bank's Gini
coecient and a benchmark's Gini coecient. All benchmarks presented before can be




Figure 1 illustrates the idea of these indices.19 A ratio that is greater than 1 means
that the individual bank is more concentrated than the benchmark portfolio, whereas
an index smaller than 1 indicates that a bank is more diversied than the benchmark
portfolio. In contrast to our distance measures these measures do not use the whole
industry structure as a benchmark but only the industry concentration. A ratio of 1
indicates equal concentration yet concentration may still occur on dierent industries.
15 It should be noted that a large dierence in one segment implies another large dierence or a number
of smaller dierences in other segments.
16 More precisely the relative dierences should be called relative absolute dierences as they are, in turn,
calculated from absolute values.
17 The measure corresponding to D1 would be the Maximum Relative Dierence. See Pngsten and
Rudolph (2002). It equals 1 as soon as at least one xi equals zero. Due to the ne division of
loan segments, the measure indeed becomes 1 for most banks and is therefore not taken into further
consideration.
18 The superscripts b;t are again suppressed for simplicity,
19 In this example with North Rhine-Westfalia as the state and D usseldorf as the county, we do not see








































































































































Figure 1: Gini coecient
Finally we apply Spearman's rank correlation coecient (RC; see, for instance, Zar (1972))
in order to quantify loan portfolio diversication. The basic idea is to compute the rank
correlation coecient between the industry structure of an individual bank's loan port-
folio and one of our benchmarks as described above. The rank correlation coecient is
standardised between  1 and 1. A rank correlation of 1 indicates that the structure of
a bank's loan portfolio is perfectly rank correlated with the structure of the benchmark's
portfolio. That is to say, all industries sorted by size have the same rank in the bank's loan
portfolios as in the benchmark's loan portfolio. Within this setting a RC of 1 therefore
stands for perfect diversication. Since for all other measures described before, large val-
ues stand for focus whereas small values stand for diversication, we dene ^ RC =  RC.
That is to say, a ^ RC of  1 stands for perfect diversication, whereas 1 represents perfect
focus.
3.4 Statistical analysis
Using the set of data with 2;218 banks, all measures of statistical diversication are
calculated for 20 observations per bank.20
For all of these measures, a xed-eect panel estimation is performed in order to check for
trends towards diversication or focus over time. We regress the measures of diversication
on a linear trend variable:
20 One exception applies: The analysis based on the industries' contribution to the GNP is based on
annual data, as semiannual data of the industries' contribution is not available. Moreover, industries'
GNP data for 2002 was not yet available at the time of our analysis. Our analysis therefore only covers
9 points of observation from 1993 to 2001 when the composition of the GNP is used as a benchmark.
-10-DMt
b =  +   time + t
b (13)
DMt
b stands for the diversication measure of bank b at time t. We perform xed eects
panel estimations on the whole banking sector as well as on bank groups for savings
banks, credit cooperatives, state banks, big banks, regional banks, and subsidiaries of
foreign banks. The panel estimator reects the average behaviour of the whole banking
sector/group, because the coecient of the trend variable is restricted to be equal for all
banks considered in the regression.
To assess the behaviour of individual banks we perform bank- level estimations. All mea-
sures of diversication are regressed on a linear trend variable for each individual bank:
DMt
b = b + b  time + t
b (14)
Thus, the distribution of the trend coecients of the bank-level regressions allows us to
assess the deviation from the average behaviour given by the panel estimator.
However, trends need not necessarily be linear. We therefore also calculate the Spearman
rank correlation coecient (RC) of a diversication measure with time on the bank level.
The distribution of RC gives us a descriptive answer to the question of whether banks'
behaviour follows a monotonic trend that is not restricted to be linear. A rank correlation
of 1 indicates that a measure increased with every step in time. A rank correlation of
 1 shows that a measure decreased with every step in time. Note that we use the RC
coecient as a measure of diversication (RC of the industry structure of an individual
bank's loan portfolio with a benchmark) as well as a statistical tool in order to analyse
changes in a diversication measure over time (RC of a diversication measure with time).
4 Empirical results
4.1 Statistical analysis of diversication
Table 221 gives a rst impression of the time paths of a selection of our diversication
measures by listing their means over all banks. These gures indicate that banks have
moved towards diversication and therefore support, at the individual bank level, the
results obtained by Pngsten and Rudolph (2002) on a highly aggregated level. Note
that, for all measures, a trend towards diversication is expressed as a decrease in the
measure.
As we aim merely at an overview, we will not present a detailed analysis of all diversica-
tion measures suggested in section 3.3.22 We start our more thorough inspection of some
measures with a closer inspection of the HHI as a measure of diversication.
21 All Tables are displayed in the Appendix.
22 Tables with some key statistics for all measures are provided upon request.
-11-Hirschman-Herndahl index
Table 3 shows key statistics of the HHI for dierent banking groups. Looking at the abso-
lute magnitude of the HHI, we see that big banks have the lowest average HHI, followed
by savings banks. That means these banks have, on average, the strongest naive diver-
sication. Subsidiaries of foreign banks and regional banks have on average the weakest
diversication.
Let us now turn to changes over time. For all banks, the panel estimator shows a highly
signicant negative trend of the HHI over time. Note that a decline in the HHI stands
for an increase in diversication. The individual trend estimations reveal that 50:72% of
all banks signicantly (at a 5% signicance level) increased naive diversication over the
last decade. Furthermore, we use the rank correlation coecient (RC) of a diversication
measure with time in order to identify monotone but not necessarily linear trends over
time. A negative RC indicates that the HHI is declining over time while diversication
increases. The mean (median) of the RC coecient over all banks is  0:2543 ( 0:4015).
67:63% of all banks have a negative RC, hinting at an increase in diversication.
When analysing the dierent banking groups, we see that these results are mainly driven
by credit cooperatives (CC) and savings banks (SB). Both groups show strong tenden-
cies towards diversication in terms of highly signicant panel trends, of majorities of
individual banks with signicant trends, as well as of majorities of individual banks with
a negative rank correlation of the HHI over time. For the group of state banks (StB),
the panel estimation reveals a signicant trend towards diversication. However, at the
individual bank level, 5 out of 13 state banks show a signicant trend towards diversica-
tion, whereas 5 other state banks show a signicant trend towards specialisation. Results
are also mixed for the groups of big banks (BB) and regional banks (RB). Subsidiaries
of foreign banks (SFB) reveal a trend towards specialisation, indicated by the panel es-
timator and by a slight majority of individual banks for whom this trend is signicant.
Such a specialisation of subsidiaries of foreign banks is not surprising because often these
banks accompany the foreign business activities of rms from their home market. For
these banks, then, a specialisation in one country can still be consistent with a diversied
portfolio at the international level.
Figure 2 further illustrates our results. It shows histograms of the Spearman rank corre-
lation coecients of the HHI over time. The upper left-hand panel shows the histogram
for all banks. It can easily be seen that a majority of banks increased their loan portfolio
diversication. The upper right-hand panel shows the corresponding histogram for credit
cooperatives whereas the lower left-hand panel shows the histogram for savings banks.
Corresponding to the gures from Table 3, one can see the strong tendencies towards
naive diversication within these two groups. The less pronounced histogram in the lower
right hand panel is based on commercial banks, combining big banks, regional banks and
subsidiaries of foreign banks.
Gini coecient
The results for the Gini coecient in Table 4 are apparently quite similar to the results
for the HHI. Note that a Gini coecient of 0 represents perfect naive diversication.
Considering the absolute magnitude of this diversication measure, we see that again big
banks followed by savings banks have the strongest diversication whereas regional banks
and subsidiaries of foreign banks are more focused. Moroever, changes in the measure over

























































































Figure 2: Histogram of RC between HHI and time for all banks, CC, SB, and CB
Shannon entropy
The results for the Shannon entropy (^ S) in Table 5 are basically in line with our results
for the HHI and the Gini coecient. Remember that maximum naive diversication is
expressed as an entropy value of  ln(23)   3:14 whereas maximum focus equals an
entropy value of 0. Among others, we again see the remarkably clear trend towards
diversication for the groups of credit cooperatives and savings banks.
Distance Measures
All measures applied so far quantify naive diversication, ie diversication is maximised
when a bank has equal exposures towards all industries. This understanding of diversica-
tion makes little sense when industries dier dramatically in size. Let us suppose that the
industries' total loan volumes are used as the benchmark for distance measures.23 Then,
rstly, not all banks can achieve perfect naive diversication if industries' loan volumes
dier, but they all can diversify perfectly with respect to distance measures. This also
shows, secondly, that measures of naive diversication, unlike distance measures, are sen-
sitive with respect to the denition of industries, which we think is a somewhat unpleasant
feature for empirical research. We therefore turn now to distance measures.
23 Contributions to GNP and total assets are other conceivable indices of size.
-13-Distance measure D2
We start with D2 as an example of an absolute distance measure. As a rst benchmark we
apply the composition of the national loan market by industry. Our results are displayed
in Table 6.
Big banks and savings banks appear to be closest to the market, whereas regional banks
and subsidiaries of foreign banks reveal the biggest distance from the national loan market
portfolio.24 Recall that the mean of D2, as of December 2002, of 29:45% for savings banks
means that they would have to rearrange, on average, 29:45% of their loan portfolio in order
to achieve the industry composition of the national loan market portfolio. Considering
the distance to the market, it can be concluded that regional banks and subsidiaries of
foreign banks are rather specialised in their loan origination.
Again, the panel estimation reveals a highly signicant trend towards diversication. It is
underpinned by the bank-level regressions, showing that at a 5% signicance level 48:33%
of all banks reveal a signicant decline in distance to the national loan market portfolio.
According to the rank correlation, 70:47% of all banks reduced their distance to the loan
market portfolio.
Again, this trend towards diversication is best viewed for credit cooperatives and savings
banks. Both groups reveal highly signicant trends towards diversication based on the
panel estimator. This trend is strongest for credit cooperatives whereas for the bank-level
regressions the group with the highest percentage of banks with a signicant trend towards
diversication is that of savings banks. Results for state banks, big banks, and regional
banks are, as almost always, rather mixed. Subsidiaries of foreign banks increased their
distance to the national loan market; this is indicated by the panel estimator and by a
majority of individual banks showing a trend towards specialisation.
Once more we use histograms to illustrate our results. Figure 3 shows histograms of
the rank correlation coecients of DNation
2 over time. It can easily be seen from the
dierent panels that large majorities of credit cooperatives and savings banks decreased
their distance to the national loan portfolio and therefore increased diversication over
the past decade. The histogram of commercial banks (big banks, regional banks, and
subsidiaries of foreign banks) underlines the fact that a majority of commercial banks
increased specialisation according to DNation
2 .
A comparison between the lower right-hand panel of Figure 3 and the lower right-hand
panel of Figure 2 shows that measuring diversication according to a concentration mea-
sure such as the HHI and according to distance measures such as DNation
2 can provide
contradicting results. This can also be seen when comparing the results of the individual
bank regressions for the four big banks. The HHI indicates that two big banks signicantly
increased naive diversication and one of the big banks has an insignicant trend towards
diversication. Applying DNation
2 as measure of diversication, we see that only one bank
has a signicant trend towards diversication. Three out of four big banks show a positive
slope of the coecient on the time variable. We will examine the relationship between the
various distance measures in more detail in Section 4.2.
24 Note that the short-hand expression "market portfolio", used for the set of all loans considered here,





















































































Figure 3: Histogram of RC between DNation
2 and time for all banks, CC, SB, and CB
Distance measure D4
After having analysed the results for the group of absolute distance measures, we will now
focus on the group of relative distance measures.25 As D4 corresponds to D2, we will
analyse it in some detail. Table 7 gives an overview of our ndings based on DNation
4 .
The results for DNation
4 support the ndings based on DNation
2 . Credit cooperatives and
savings banks show a highly signicant trend towards diversication whereas big banks,
regional banks, and subsidiaries of foreign banks show a tendency towards specialisation
as indicated by the panel estimator. The regressions on the bank level show majorities of
individual banks with a signicant trend towards focus for state banks, regional banks and
subsidiaries of foreign banks. Big banks reveal a slight tendency towards an increase in
distance to the national loan market, but it must be taken into account that these banks
are on average still closest to the market.
Distance measure D2 with regional benchmarks
We have found a movement towards the nation's loan market portfolio especially for the
groups of credit cooperatives and savings banks. However, the individual banks within
these groups operate in regional markets. Hence the observed tendency towards diversi-
cation is economically not fully convincing and may be merely the result of changes in
25 By and large our results for measure D2 are supported by the other absolute distance measures.
-15-regional industry structures. Thus, it seems preferable to consider regional benchmarks
such as the compositions of a state's loan portfolio or a county's loan portfolio. We will




2 respectively. Note that regional benchmarks do not make sense
for big banks and subsidiaries of foreign banks as they generally operate nationwide. Fur-
thermore, the composition of a county's loan portfolio is not an appropriate benchmark
for state banks.
The composition of a state's loan portfolio must be considered the appropriate benchmark
for state banks. Applying DState
2 indeed reveals a signicant trend towards diversication
for this group of banks, indicated by the panel trend coecient as well as by a majority
of banks with such behaviour. DState
2 also still shows highly signicant trends towards
diversication for credit cooperatives and savings banks. For these banks, the results
continue to hold even if the benchmark is broken down to county level.
For both benchmarks, however, D2 reveals a tendency towards focus for the group of
regional banks, as indicated by the panel estimator, and a majority of individual banks
with a signicant trend towards focus. Moreover, this group of banks is characterised
by having, on average, the greatest deviation from the two local benchmarks. This sup-
ports our earlier impression that regional banks seem to be more specialised in their loan
origination.
Distance measure D2 with contribution to GNP as benchmark
As a fourth benchmark to be applied with distance measures, we analyse the composition of
the industries' contribution to GNP. This time we must refer to annual data, as semiannual
data of the industries' contribution to GNP were not readily available. Again we use D2
as the example to illustrate our results. The key statistics of DGNP
2 are provided in Table
10.
Despite signicance levels many other studies would be happy about, the results for DGNP
2
are not as clear as for other measures. For most groups of banks we see mixed results.
Only credit cooperatives still display a tendency towards diversication and, to a lesser
extent, subsidiaries of foreign banks towards specialisation. As a tentative explanation for
the much lesser signicance, we oer the thesis that contribution to the GNP and loan
nancing may not necessarily be highly correlated, eg due to variations in equity ratios,
and hence banks do not use GNP gures as a guideline for limits on their exposure to
industries.
Benchmark Gini
We wind up our analysis with BGNation and RCNation. Let us recall that BGNation stands
for the ratio of an individual bank's Gini coecient and the national loan market's Gini
coecient. Remember that a ratio bigger than 1 means that the individual bank is more
focused than the national loan portfolio. Thus, a decrease in this measure stands for an
increase in diversication. Results for BGNation are displayed in Table 11.
It is striking to see that all bank groups have a highly signicant panel trend towards
diversication as measured by BGNation. Moreover, for all bank groups we see clear
absolute majorities of individual banks with such a trend being signicant and even vast
majorities, from about 70% to almost 90%, of banks with rank correlation indicating this
trend.
-16-Considering Figure 1, this nding means that the Lorenz curve for most individual banks
has approached the diagonal, and hence naive diversication, more (or moved away from
it less) than the Lorenz curve of the national loan portfolio has over the last decade.
As long as a bank's individual loan portfolio started out more concentrated than the
nation's, which seems to be the dominant case according to the initial group-wise means
of BGNation, this implies that the former has come closer to the latter.
Interestingly, at the end of 2002 the four big banks had, on average, the same Gini coe-
cient as the national market loan portfolio BGNation. The Gini coecient of the national
loan portfolio had a signicant positive trend over this period. That is to say, the concen-
tration of the national loan portfolio signicantly increased over time. For the big banks,
this means that their slightly higher loan portfolio concentration compared to the national
loan portfolio increased less than the latter.
Rank correlation
The key statistics for the ^ RC =  RC as a measure of diversication are displayed in Table
12. Remember that a RC ( ^ RC) of 1 ( 1) represents perfect rank correlation of individual
bank's loan portfolio structure with the structure of the benchmark portfolio. Economi-
cally, the largest industry in both portfolios is the same, as is the second largest, and so
on. Thus, within this setting a RC ( ^ RC) of 1 ( 1) represents perfect diversication.26
As the readers will by now expect, the results for credit cooperatives and savings banks
indicate a trend towards diversication. Surprisingly, we see a trend towards diversication
within the group of regional banks. The panel estimator reects a signicant trend towards
diversication. Moreover, we observe a majority of individual regional banks with a trend
towards diversication. State banks and subsidiaries of foreign banks show a trend towards
focus, whereas the results for the big banks are not conclusive.
Brief summary
We can sum up by saying that for all measures (concentration measures as well as distance
measures) most banks show a signicant trend towards diversifying their loan portfolios.
A comparison of the analysed measures of diversication for the group of all banks is
provided in Table 13. The trend towards diversication is especially driven by the large
number of credit cooperatives and savings banks. However, we also see that regional
banks and subsidiaries of foreign banks are and becoming even more specialised in their
loan origination. Their concentration measures are, on average, higher than those of other
banking groups, and distance measures of these banks deviate rather widely from the
benchmark loan portfolios. Moreover, time series analyses, by and large, reveal no trend
towards diversication for these groups. For the state banks and the big banks, the latter
being closest to the market, the results are rather mixed.27
26 Admittedly, this is a rather weak property here, in particular when there are noticeable size dierences
between industries.
27 Results for the groups of big banks and state banks must be interpreted very carefully. First of all,
these banks are involved in the market for credit derivatives. Thus, the data of the loan statistics
might not perfectly reect the exposures of these banks. Secondly, these banks (especially the big
banks) have the strongest inuence of all banks on the benchmarks. It is therefore not surprising that
they are closest to the benchmarks.
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The previous section has shown that dierent measures of diversication may lead to
dierent results. We therefore now turn to a more detailed analysis of the relationship
between dierent measures of diversication.
We start our analysis with a correlation matrix of a selection of our diversication measures
(Table 14). The correlations between the measures of diversication are calculated with 20
observations for each bank.28 RCNation, only taking into account the rankings of industry
shares but not the actual industry shares within a portfolio, has the lowest correlation (in
absolute value) with all other diversication measures. HHI is next. Although we have
obtained some dierences in signicance in our previous results when using the composition
of GNP as a benchmark in comparison to other benchmarks, the correlations of DGNP
2
and DGNP
4 with other measures do not indicate a major divergence.
Comparing the HHI with distance measures
In a next step, we condense each time series for a bank into one observation. More
specically, we compare the relationship of the rank correlations of various measures over
time. The corresponding dierences that appear in the bank trend in diversication when
measured, for example, by the HHI and a distance measures are emphasised by Figure 4.
Its four panels display the relationship between the rank correlation over time of the HHI
and the distance measures DNation
1 , DNation
2 , DNation
3 , and DNation
4 . Each dot in a scatter
plot represents a single one of our total set of 2218 banks.
An example should help to understand the bottom line of these scatter plots: Let us
consider an individual bank located close to the upper left-hand corner of one of these
panels. Such an individual bank has a negative rank correlation of the HHI over time,
in fact, of just a little above the minimum of  1, and at the same time a positive rank
correlation, close to the maximum of 1, of the distance measure used in this panel over time.
This tells us that this individual bank simultaneously increased the naive diversication
of its loan portfolio and increased its distance towards the national loan market portfolio.
We have already seen this phenomenon for the big banks before. A bank close to the lower
right corner of a panel in one of these scatter plots represents the opposite eect: It has
increased its specialisation over time as measured by the HHI but decreased the distance
towards the national loan market portfolio at the same time.
Contradicting results for the HHI and a distance measure can be caused, for instance, by
increasing the share of loans towards small industries at the expense of the share of loans
towards larger industries. As mentioned before, glass and ceramics, for example, only
accounted for 0:6% of Germany's loan market at end-2002 but trade for 12:7%. Thus, if
a bank increases its share in glass and ceramics from 0:7% to 1.0%, say, and reduces its
share in trade from 12:6% to 12:3%, it would increase its naive diversication but at the
same time increase its separation from the national loan market.
28 One exception applies: When calculating the correlation with a measure that uses GNP as a benchmark,
only 9 observations for each bank are used.






There are plausible arguments for using the HHI as well as distance measures as statisti-
cal measures of diversication. If both were just dierent numerical representations of the
same concept, the scatter plots would have all dots on an upward sloping, but not nec-
essarily straight, line. Alas, this is not what we see. Instead, we nd that diversication
according to the HHI is not very closely correlated with diversication according to dis-
tance measures. In many cases the HHI shows a strong increase in focus, whereas distance
measures indicate that the bank's loan portfolio distance towards the market decreased
and vice versa.
The scatterplots reveal that for individual banks dierent diversication measures may
lead to contradicting results. However, the aggregate results for Germany presented so
far were robust to the choice of the diversication measure and revealed trends towards
diversication for virtually all measures. This is reected in the high frequency of banks
in the south-western quadrant of the scatterplots. These banks show a trend towards
naive diversication and a decline in distance to the market at the same time. Moreover,
readers may also wonder why we observe similar levels of signicance for dierent measures,
although these measures may lead to contradicting results on an individual bank level. We
oer the following explanation: In basically all scatter plots shown so far and later on, we
nd similar numbers of banks above and below a line that might serve as an approximate
monotonic relation between the measures being compared. Therefore, even when the
trends found for bank groups were about the same for dierent measures and had similar
levels of signicance, it is still possible that the banks with such a trend and those with
opposite behaviour were not the same for both measures. Put dierently, a lack of striking
-19-dierences between measures at the aggregate level does not imply that their assessment
for individual banks will be very similar.
It is interesting to note that, among the group of distance measures, the results for DNation
1
and DNation
3 seem to be most consistent with the results from the HHI (cf the scatter plots
on the left-hand side of Figure 4). This is not much of a surprise since the HHI is an abso-
lute measure (with the 1=n benchmark), and one would certainly expect the most similar
results to show up with the absolute and not the relative distance measures. Not quite
in line with this, and unfortunately for no obvious reason, the results for the normalised
sum of absolute dierences (DNation
2 ; cf upper right-hand panel) dier considerably from
the results for the HHI. The lack of agreement of the measures for individual banks is less
surprising and even more obvious when comparing the relative distance measure DNation
4
(lower right-hand panel of Figure 4) with the HHI.
Comparing dierent distance measures
These ndings urge us to take a closer look at the relationships between dierent distance
measures. Figure 5 illustrates the divergences in results between the rank correlation of
DNation
2 over time and the rank correlation over time of other distance measures using
the same benchmark. Similar scatter plots for the relationship of DNation
4 with the other
distance measures using the national loan portfolio as the benchmark are illustrated in
Figure 6.
Figure 5: Relationship between RC of DNation






-20-Figure 6: Relationship between RC of DNation






Applying the two absolute measures D2 and D3 apparently leads to very similar results
(upper right-hand panel of Figure 5). The same holds for a pair of relative distance
measures, D4 and D5 (lower right-hand panel of Figure 6). In contrast, we see major
divergences in results when calculating diversication according to an absolute distance
measure, on the one hand, and a relative distance measure, on the other. In many cases
these measures indicate movements in opposite directions. And even within the group of
absolute distance measures we see a pair of measures with a clear disagreement, D2 and
D1 (upper left-hand panel of Figure 5).
Relevance of benchmarks
Finally, we examine the outcome when one diversication measure is applied with various
benchmarks. Figure 7 shows scatter plots of the RC of D2 over time, where the three
panels dier in the benchmarks being used. It is not surprising that results for the national
loan portfolio and the states' loan portfolios (panel on the upper left-hand side) are more
consistent with each other than the results for the national loan portfolio and the counties'
loan portfolios (panel on the upper right-hand side).
-21-Figure 7: Relationship between RC of DNation
2 , RC of DState
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2 , and of RC
DGNP
2 over time
The bottom panel of Figure 7 illustrates the fairly large dierences when the national
loan portfolio and the industries' contribution to the GNP are used as benchmarks with
distance measure D2. Readers may recall that the results for GNP as a benchmark were
less clear-cut (cf Table 10). This is also visible here because, unlike in the other panels,
the entries above and below a virtual line for an approximate monotonic relationship
between the measures seem to be very dierent in numbers and also biased to the bottom
right-hand corner.
At any rate, we can infer that results regarding diversication versus focus in general do
not only depend on the choice of a particular distance measure but also vary with the
benchmark used when a distance measure is applied.
In the absence of reliable risk and return data on loan segments, it is common practice
to use the HHI as a measure of statistical diversication. Our ndings show that this
practice can be misleading, at least at the individual bank level. The results illustrate
the informational power of distance measures as measures of statistical diversication. It
would therefore be interesting to test the robustness of the results of Acharya et al. (2004)
when applying other measures of diversication, eg the distance measures advocated here.
However, even dierent distance measures can sometimes indicate contradicting trends on
the individual bank level. Thus, we have to be very careful when working with necessarily
simplifying measures of statistical diversication. To date, no single measure seems to be
unanimously superior, and hence more research is needed to discriminate between dierent
alternatives. In order to do so, more reference to initial principles or very specic purposes
for applications may be required.
-22-5 Conclusion
We have applied a broad set of diversication measures to the national loan portfolios
of German banks for the period from 1993 to 2002. The measures used in this paper
are concentration measures and distance measures. Concentration measures capture the
dierence between a portfolio and naive diversication. Distance measures allow the use
of benchmarks that reect the industry structure of an economy. For all measures we nd
that the majority of banks exhibit a signicant trend towards increasing diversication.
We nd a strong trend towards diversication within the group of credit cooperatives and
savings banks, a phenomenon indicated by highly signicant trend coecients of the panel
estimations and the majority of single bank estimations. The results for state banks and
big banks are mixed. However, concerning the absolute magnitude of our diversication
measures, big banks show the highest level of diversication across all measures. Given
the level of diversication, it is therefore not surprising that they do not show any further
trends towards diversication. However, it must be mentioned that results for big banks
and state banks are probably inuenced by the usage of credit derivatives. Regional banks
and subsidiaries of foreign banks have, on average, the highest concentration measures and
are found to have the biggest distance to the benchmark loan portfolios. Moreover, by
and large they reveal no tendency towards diversication. Therefore, the overall result of
an increasing diversication of German banks' loan portfolios seems to be driven by the
large number of credit cooperatives and savings banks.
Our ndings are independent of the large number of mergers over the last decade, since
in our analysis all banks that have merged during the period of observation have been
treated as being merged over the whole period. A possible explanation for our results
might be that bank managers have become more aware of loan portfolio diversication
and that, in the same period, sophisticated techniques of managing loan portfolios have
become more and more available to small banks, too. The tendency toward diversication
might have been enforced by the broad debate on credit risk in the context of Basel II
and some defaults and problems of German banks due to the poor quality of their loan
portfolios in recent years.
The specialisation observed for subsidiaries of foreign banks is not surprising, since these
banks typically accompany their national enterprises abroad. Therefore, specialisation
of the national loan portfolio does not imply international specialisation. For the group
of regional banks (which according to the Deutsche Bundesbank's classication mainly
includes private bankers) the observed specialisation may be explained as a strategy of
seeking niches in the competitive German banking market.
Although the trends described so far are revealed by virtually all measures, we nd that,
at an individual level, the diversication measures may dier signicantly. It is notable
that concentration measures and distance measures often produce contradicting results.
The dierence is relevant for banks, which, in the absence of reliable loan portfolio risk
measurement tools, rely on diversication measures for portfolio management. We believe
that distance measures are generally superior to concentration measures, since by their
very denition they are well-suited to incorporate the structure of the market a bank




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































-35-Table 13: Comparison of diversication measures (results for all banks)
HHI G ^ S DNation
2 DNation
4
Number of banks 2218 2218 2218 2218 2218
Mean of Diversication Measure (DM)
Mean of DM (June 1993) 0.1706 0.6527 -2.25 0.4389 0.5196
Mean of DM (Dec 2002) 0.1529 0.6331 -2.33 0.4128 0.4869
Panel estimation
Panel trend -0.000935 -0.001189 -0.004242 -0.001961 -0.001969
t-statistic -25.23*** -48.06*** -41.78*** -59.93*** -62.17***
Bank level regression
Percentage of banks with trend1
signicantly< 0 50.72% 46.93% 49.95% 48.33% 48.69%
insignicantly 32.05% 34.26% 32.42% 37.34% 37.10%
signicantly> 0 17.22% 18.80% 17.63% 14.34% 14.20%
Spearman rank correlation coecient (RC)
Mean of RC -0.2543 -0.2199 -0.2528 -0.2520 -0.2618
Median of RC -0.4015 -0.3549 -0.3985 -0.3579 -0.3759





2 BGNation ^ RC
Nation
Number of banks 2218 2218 2218 2218 2218
Mean of Diversication Measure (DM)
Mean of DM (June 1993) 0.3936 0.3517 0.4306 1.49 -0.4773
Mean of DM (Dec 2002) 0.3859 0.3315 0.4187 1.32 -0.5182
Panel estimation
Panel trend -0.001100 -0.001370 -0.000690 -0.007372 -0.003121
t-statistic -32.09*** -37.33*** -13.47*** -136.43*** -45.91***
Bank level regression
Percentage of banks with trend1
signicantly< 0 40.40% 42.56 26.33% 73.04% 39.00%
insignicantly 38.28% 35.21% 54.52% 21.51% 45.18%
signicantly> 0 21.33% 22.23% 19.12% 5.46% 15.83%
Spearman rank correlation coecient (RC)
Mean of RC -0.1377 -0.1463 -0.0781 -0.5421 -0.1725
Median of RC -0.2241 -0.2383 -0.1333 -0.7135 -0.2493
Percentage of banks with RC< 0 62.26% 61.27% 55.46% 86.29% 65.24%
***,**,* indicate statistical signicance at the 1, 5, 10 percent level respectively.
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